28:MAY:2009

AUSA LONGEACH





C4, SPACE & CYBER: ENABLING THE GLOBAL NETWORK ENTERPRISE CONSTRUCT

Chief Information Officer/G-6

AMERICA'S ARMY: THE STRENGTH OF THE NATION
ARMY STRONG



Agenda



- Restoring Balance
- CONUS Based & Expeditionary
- Global Network Enterprise Construct
 - Network Service Centers
 - Operational Validation AC09
- © Cyber Operations & Warfare
 - Army Cyber Operations & CND Support
 - USCYBERCOM & 7SC(T)
- © C4 & Space
- Conclusions





4 Army Imperatives




CURRENT



- Demand Exceeding Supply
- Dwell ~ 1:1 for AC & <1:4 for RC Soldiers
- Irregular Warfare-focused Force
- Limited Strategic Flexibility
- Accelerated Equipment Wear-Out
- Soldier and Family Stress

Restoring Balance



IMPERATIVES

- Sustain
- Prepare
- Reset
- Transform

FUTURE

Current and Future Demands Readiness
+ Strategic
Flexibility
Sustain
Volunteer
Force




- Growth Completed
- Dwell ~ 1:2 for AC & ~ 1:4 for RC
- Base Realignment Complete
- Modular Reorganization Complete
- Rebalancing Complete
- Rotational Readiness Model Implemented
- Forces Ready for Full Spectrum of Operations



Situation – CONUS Based and Expeditionary





Many expeditionary capabilities are

NETWORK dependent



Enterprise Enablers



Transport







Operational

Tactical

Strategic fiber backbone links to tactical edge

Enables pre-staging data and services for **Expeditionary Modular Forces**



Enterprise Enablers





- Strategic computing centers provide storage and processors
- Enables pre-staging data and services for Expeditionary Modular Forces



Enterprise Enablers



NetOps







Strategic

Operational

Tactical

NetOps coordinates elements required to maneuver data and services in support of the Main Effort

Understand, Visualize, Describe, and Direct the Network



Network Service Center – Concept



Regional Hub Node (RHN)

- Provides Global Transport
- Intra-Theater Connectivity
- Up to 3 Div per Hub Node
- Connect to each other & DISN services in garrison

Area Processing Center (APC)

- Data & Applications
- Consolidated IT hardware
- Projection & forward staging of info & services


Theater NetOps & Security Center (TNOSC)

- Technical oversight, enterprise, content, spectrum & Help Desk
- NetOps SA & optimize GIG avail
- Information Assurance & Security



Network Service Center – Concept






The "Always On" Network



Global NSC Construct








NSC Concept of Operation








Organizational

LandWarNet Now

- Fragmented
- Not Standardized
- Unsecure
- Expensive





Federated



\$\$\$



Enterprise

LandWarNet Future

- Global
- Standardized
- Protected
- Economical



CSA – GNEC Memo



- "transforming to become...a versatile, expeditionary force capable of full-spectrum operations"
- "synchronize...with other Army activities...ARFORGEN, BRAC, GDP"
- "We will use the...GNEC as the network enterprise strategy"
- "CIO/G6 will establish new procedures to operationalize ... improve the overall security ... achieve better efficiencies ... pursue joint interoperability as we construct our network enterprise"
- "all Army generating force networks will be managed by a single command (NETCOM) organizing Army information to make it globally accessible, useful and secure for soldiers deployed anywhere"



UNITED STATES ARMY

THE CHIEF OF STAFF

MAR 2 2009

MEMORANDUM FOR SEE DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: LandWarNet - Global Network Enterprise Construct Strategy Implementation


- 1. We are transforming to become a fundamentally different Army--a versatile, expeditionary force capable of full-spectrum operations. To support this Army, we must fundamentally change and adapt our institutions, including LandWarNet--the Army's portion of the Global Information Grid. Over the next three years, the Army will transform LandWarNet to a centralized, more secure, operationalized, and sustainable network capable of supporting an expeditionary Army in this era of persistent conflict. To lay the foundation for further network expansion in the future, we will synchronize this transformation with other Army activities including the Army Force Generation model, Base Realignment and Closure, and Global Defense Posture Realignment. In FY09, we will set the foundation for the global network by achieving an initial operating capability of a network service center (NSC) in Europe; expanding these NSCs throughout all other Theaters by FY11.
- 2. We will use the Global Network Enterprise Construct (GNEC) as the network enterprise strategy. The CIO/G6 will establish new procedures to operationalize the network and improve the overall security of network services and capabilities. We will modify purchasing procedures to achieve better efficiencies in the procurement of our IT systems, and we will pursue joint interoperability with our other Service partners as we construct our network enterprise.
- 3. In the end, all Army generating force networks will be managed by a single command (Network Enterprise Technology Command (NETCOM)) organizing Army information to make it globally accessible, useful and secure for Soldiers deployed anywhere in the world.
- 4. The establishment of the Army global network enterprise requires dramatic changes to our current processes and network operations. Our combat-seasoned force is the best in the world, and transforming our network enterprise is central to a land force capable of conducting full-spectrum operations in the 21st Century. Your support is essential for our success.

General United States Arms



Strategy





Transition from multiple unit-owned networks to single enterprise network



Implementation Strategy



Phase 1: FY09 – NSC in Europe

- Aggregate/Discover & Establish Network Main effort: CONUS, Europe & SWA; Supporting: PAC
- Focus on greater collaboration & network access to lower echelons, eliminate expeditionary capability gaps to CONUS & Europe
- Enhance ability to provide and defend Network & Governance

Phase 2: FY10 - NSCs in CONUS & SWA

- Extend Network Main effort: CONUS, Europe & SWA; Supporting: PAC
- Eliminate more expeditionary capability gaps CONUS, Europe & SWA

Phase 3: FY11 and Beyond – NSC in Pacific

- Complete Network Main effort: PAC; Supporting: CONUS, Europe & SWA
- Ubiquitous access globally consistent security policies

Theater-based NSC deployment with Global effectiveness & efficiencies improvements



GNEC OPVAL Concept

E-Mail

Portal

Top COP

CPOF MR

NSC OCONUS






OCONUS

Commercial

Ku-Band Satellite

Teleport



Unit exercises movement through all phases of joint operations using NSC capabilities







GNEC OPVAL – AC 09



Objectives

Operational

- Seamlessly transition
 BCT from CONUS OCONUS
- NSC Handoff between two Signal Command (Theater)
- Continuity of Operations selected Battle Command
- Refine NSC Doctrine
- Demo Battle Command application delivery from the Enterprise

Technical

- SIPRNet
 Collaboration buildout at two APCs
- Demo Single Identity
- Validate Resource Forest for Collaboration
- Satellite crossstrapping in support of operations

Training

- NSC Concept of Ops
 & Tactics, Techniques
 & Procedures (TTP)
- CONUS/Europe multi-Theater Signal Ops
- Refine Battle
 Command Assistance
 Team (BCAT)
- Exercise NETCOM
 Staff under GNEC
- Exercise early crosstheater collaboration



GNEC OPVAL Demo – AC 09




RED = Demonstrated in AC 09 Connectivity

- GIG Integration
- Regional Networks
- Base Infrastructure
- SATCOM Connect/Management
- DISN Optimization
- Single DOIM

Services

- Data Strategy
- Authoritative Data
- Data Warehouse
- Virtualized Services
- Web Portals
- ·SOA
- Collaboration
- Integration of Joint Services
- Portfolio Management
- Green IT



Other

- Global/Theater Commands
- Joint Basing Communications
- Enterprise Governance
- Network Training

NetOps

- Security Policy
- Service Level Agreements
- Global Identity Mgmt
- Single Logical Network/Federation
- Network Provisioning
- Network SA
- Content Delivery/ Caching
- Spectrum Mgmt

Global Network Enterprise Construct (GNEC)



AC 09 OPVAL – Accomplishments



> Operational:

- Completed ROC Drills with NSC CONOPS, Control Plan & detailed script
- Employment of first 7SC(T) Network Enterprise Support Team (NEST)
- Executed Phases 0/1 (WARNORD) & 2/3 (BCCS Bragg→Grafenwöhr APC)
- 18th Fires Bde provided Battle Command services & standard services

> Technical:

- Build out 2 SIPRNet APCs (Ft Bragg & Grafenwöhr GE)
- PEO C3T field & train new Battle Command suite (BCCSv3) to 18th Fires Bde
- Virtualized 18th Fires Bde BCCSv3 within SIPRNet APCs
- Satellite cross-strap between 18th Fires Bde JNN and Germany RHN


> Training:

- Finalized 10 specific NSC Tactics, Techniques & Procedures (TTP)
- Trained 20+ Observer-Controllers (OC) to validate OPVAL Measures of Effectiveness/Performance (MoE/MoP)
- OC evaluation of OPVAL Phases 0-3
- 18th Fires Bde operating BCCSv3 & standard services virtually via remote RHN connection



Timeline







Cyber Operations Governance



Agencies

Field Activities Others (40)



General Kevin P. Chilton CDR USSTRATCOM

LTG Pollett CDR JTF-GNO BG Davis DEP CDR JTF-GNO

Headquarters (4)



OSD (x2)



DODIG



Joint Staff

Services (4)

NetOps Ctrs (7)



Army



Air Force



DISA (x7)



Navv



Marine Corps

Operational Control of Service Network Operations and Security Centers **Combatant Commanders (10)**



SOCOM



CENTCOM



EUCOM



PACOM





SOUTHCOM STRATCOM







TRANSCOM

AFRICOM



Network Defense Definitions



Network Defense: Incorporates end-to-end protection, detection, and response to unauthorized access, inadvertent damage, or modification of data and the GIG (JP 6-0)

<u>Information Assurance</u>: Measures to insure availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, non-repudiation, and restoration of information and systems (FM 3-0, JP 3-13)

Computer Network Defense (CND): Actions taken to protect, monitor, analyze, detect, and respond to unauthorized activity within DoD information systems and networks (FM 3-0, JP 6-0)

Computer Network Defense – Response Actions (CND-RA):

Defensive measures or activities to protect and defend DoD computer systems and networks under attack (GIG NetOps CONOPS)

<u>Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP)</u>: Actions to prevent, remediate, or mitigate risks resulting from vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure assets (JP 1-02, JP 6-0)

NetOps



Network Defense:

IA

CND

CND-RA

CIP



Information Assurance vs. CND



► Information Assurance (IA)

- Measures to insure availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, non-repudiation, and restoration of information and systems
- Considers both technical and non-technical information protection measures (such as risk management, personnel training, audits, business continuity/disaster recovery planning, etc.)
- Holistically factors all incidents that occur through malicious or nonmalicious activity by enemy or friendly entities

Computer Network Defense (CND)

- Operational component of IA provides defensive measures to protect and defend information, information systems, and networks from disruption, denial, degradation, or destruction
- Established to achieve technical actions of IA performed specifically to protect, monitor, analyze, detect, and respond to unauthorized, malicious activity on Army networks



Warfighter Requirements




- Ability to gain <u>situational awareness/understanding</u> of operations in Army cyberspace
- Ability to <u>conduct operations</u> that ensure units can freely establish and <u>access</u> Army cyberspace
- ➤ Ability to <u>command and control</u> warfighting functions in Army cyberspace
- Ability to conduct an <u>intelligence preparation</u> of the operational cyberenvironment
- > Ability to protect information and information systems from harm
- Ability to <u>sustain</u> Army cyberspace in order to achieve mission assurance
- Ability to <u>direct</u> the movement and maneuver of <u>information</u> within Army cyberspace
- Ability for the commander to <u>deliver net-enabled effects</u> in and through Army cyberspace



Army Cyber Operations Support








Army CND Service Providers







"Strategy to Task" for Cyberspace



US Government/DoD/Joint

National Strategy to Defend Cyberspace

National Security Presidential Dir 54 – Cybersecurity Policy

DHS Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative

National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations (NMS-CO)

NMS-CO Cyberspace Implementation Plan

Unified Command Plan (UCP) - 2008

USSTRATCOM Concept Plan 8039

USSTRATCOM Operational Concept for Cyberspace

USSTRATCOM Cyber DOTMLPF Change Request

USSTRATCOM Joint Manning Document – Joint Functional Component Command – Network Warfare

Joint Staff Action Processing Form 08-01907 – Cyberspace Operations Definition

Joint Staff Action Processing Form 08-00559 – Proposed US Cyber Command


<u>Army</u>

- Computer Network
 Operations Standing
 Execute Order 096-08
- Army Provisional Network Warfare Battalion
- Army Operations Plan 8039
- Army Cyber Career Field Model (in development)
- Staffing formal Army response to OSD/QDR questions and Army position for recommended DoD cyber organization



Army Cyber Command & Control (C2)







VCSA – ACTF ALARACT



UNCLASSIFIED//

THIS MESSAGE HAS BEEN SENT BY THE PENTAGON TELECOMMUNICATIONS CENTER NBEHALF OF DA WASHINGTON DO//DAMO-OD ON BEHALF OF VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMY!/

SUBJ: ACTIVATION OF US ARMY CYBERSPACE TASK FORCE (ACTF)

REF/A/MSGID: MSG/HQDA/251855Z JAN 08

REF/B/MSGID: MEMO/CYBERSPACE DEFINITION/12 MAY 2008

REF/C/MSGID: MEMO/CYPERSPACE OPERATIONS DEFINITION/15 OCT 2008
REF/D/MSGID: MEETING AMONG DCS G-2, DCS G-3/6/7, AND CIC/IG-6/30 MAR 2009

REFJE/MSGID: DODD 3600.01/INFORMATION OPERATIONS/14 AUG 2006

REF A IS THE HODA EXORD WHICH DESCRIBES HOW COMPUTER NETWORK OPERATIONS IS EXERCISED IN THE ARMY.

REF B IS THE DEPSECDEF DEFINITION OF CYBERSPACE

REF C IS THE DEPSECDEF DEFINITION OF CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS.

REF D IS THE DCS G-2, DCS G-3/5/7, CIO/G-6 AGREEMENT TO ESTABLISH AN ARMY

CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS TASK FORCE

REF E IS THE DOD DIRECTIVE THAT DEFINES THE TERM INFORMATION OPERATIONS.

NARR/(U). THIS IS THE HODA ACTIVATION OF THE ARMY CYBERSPACE TASK FORCE.

- THIS MESSAGE ANNOUNCES THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE US ARMY CYBERSPACE TASK FORCE (ACTF) AND CUTLINES ITS MISSION AND FUNCTIONS. THIS MESSAGE ALSO INCLUDES THE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR INTEGRATING CYBERSPACE ISSUES WITHIN THE ARMY STAFF (ARSTAF).
- THE ARMY G-3/5/7 IS DIRECTED TO ESTABLISH THE ACTF WHICH WILL RESIDE WITHIN THE DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS, READINESS AND MOBILIZATION (DAMO-ODIG-3/3).
- MISSION: THE MISSION OF THE ACTF IS TO INTEGRATE EFFORTS ACROSS THE ARSTAF TO PROVIDE POLICY, OVERSIGHT, AND GUIDANCE FOR ARMY CYBERSPACE AND CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS.
- 4. CONCEPT OF OPERATION. THE ACTF WILL DEVELOP AND INSTITUTIONALIZE POLICY, PROCEDURES, AND VALIDATE REQUIREMENTS AND PROVIDE RESOURCES FOR ADVANCED TECHNOLOGICAL SOLUTIONS DESIGNED TO ENABLE ARMYS ABILITY TO OPERATE IN CYBERSPACE FROM THE STRATEGIC THROUGH TACTICAL LEVELS OF WARFARE. THE ACTF WILL MODIFY THE COMPUTER NETWORK OPERATIONS (CNO) EXORD WITHIN 60 DAYS OF ACTIVATION. THE EXORD WILL CLARIFY ARMY AUTHORITIES, ROLES, FUNCTIONS, SUPPORT AND COMMAND AND CONTROL RELATIONSHIPS FOR ARMY CYBERSPACE ORGANIZATIONS AND CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS
- 5. TASK ORGANIZATION: CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS CROSSES NUMEROUS RESPONSIBILITIES AND FUNCTIONS WHICH REQUIRES THE ACTF MEMBERSHIP TO CONSIST OF REPRESENTATION FROM THE DCS G-2, DCS G-3/5/7, AND CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER/G-6. EACH RESPECTIVE STAFF WILL PROVIDE PERSONNEL TO THE TASK FORCE, SERVING UNDER THE G-33, TO ENSURE CONTINUITY OF EFFORT.
 6. DECONFLICTION: COMPUTER NETWORK OPERATIONS IS A COMPONENT OF BOTH CYBERSPACE CPERATIONS AND INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND REQUIRES DECONFLICTION AT THE NATIONAL AND JOINT LEVELS. THE HQDA ACTF WILL COORDINATE ALL CNO RELATED ACTIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF A AND THE TO BE PUBLISHED EXORD IN ACCORDANCE WITH RATIONAL, DOD AND JOINT GUIDANCE.
- THIS MESSAGE WILL REMAIN IN EFFECT UNTIL RESCINDED.
 POC FOR THIS ACTION IS LTC BRYANT GLANDO, G-3/5/7, DAMO-ODI, AT COMMERCIAL: (703) 697-3637.
- 9. EXPIRATION DATE CANNOT BE DETERMINED TOP OF MESSAGE


- "Announces establishment of the US Army Cyberspace Task Force (ACTF) and outlines its missions and functions"
- "Army G-3/5/7 is directed to establish the ACTF which will reside within the Directorate of Operations, Readiness and Mobilization"
- "Mission of the ACTF is to integrate efforts across the ARSTAF to provide policy, oversight, and guidance for Army Cyberspace and Cyberspace operations"
- ➤ "ACTF membership to consist of representation from the DCS G-2, G-3/5/7, and CIO/G-6 ... serving under the G-33"
- "CNO is a component of both Cyberspace Operations and Information Operations and requires deconfliction at the National and Joint levels"



Challenges



- Vulnerability of critical infrastructures
 - Banking, Finance, etc.
 - Impact on military operations
- > Adversaries are well trained and equipped



- Risks posed by foreign interests/ownership of tools we purchase
- Need for cyber professionals
 - Deep technical skills that cross all cyber elements
 - Understand how to incorporate cyber operations into the deliberate planning process





CND Support Examples



Long Range Plan

Mid-Range Plan

ARMY CIO / G6	NETCOM	A-GNOSC	ACERT / 1 ST IO
-Policy -CIO / EB -Portfolio Mgmt -NetOps Campaign Plan SIG Center TRADOC -Doctrine -Training Development -Force Integration -Mobilization	- Capabilities Design - CONOPS development - Test Plan - Pilot - Implementation Plan - Initial Funding - LOM - New Equipment Training - Controller IA Funding - Guidance IA Policy - Initial CON / ATO	 IA Vulnerability Message Mgmt IP Block Global NetOps Directives SA Formula, NetCrop Portal DNS Poisoning POR Integration Enterprise Tools Mgmt Vulnerability Mgmt CNO Integration TTPs Battle Command Assistance Team (BCAT) Remediation Lead 	 Detailed Media Analysis Enterprise Sensor Management Global Security Event Correlation Malicious Code Behavioral Analysis Collection Plan Technical Assessment Forensic Malware Analysis Vulnerability Assessment Team Technical Support Analysis



Enduring CND Capabilities



- Protect Army information, information systems, and communications networks from unauthorized, malicious activity
- Monitor Army information, information systems, and communications networks for unauthorized, malicious activity
- <u>Detect</u> unauthorized, malicious activity within Army information, information systems, and communications networks
- Analyze unauthorized, malicious activity within Army information, information systems, and communications networks
- <u>Respond</u> to unauthorized, malicious activity within Army information, information systems, and communications networks




Summary of Signal <u>Warrant Officer Realignment</u>






Objective MOS Structure FY12





USCYBERCOM Organization







USCYBERCOM FOC Timeline



"...the prosperity and security of our Nation rely on cyberspace to achieve strategic advantage and strengthen the instruments of national power."

- National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations (Dec 06)

Oct 10
Oct 09
USCYBERCOM
FOC
USCYBERCOM
IOC

Apr 09

SecDef Order to Establish Subunified USCYBERCOM

Nov 08

NSC 60-Day
Report Complete

Nov 05

JFCC-NW OPCON of JTF-GNO
- Single Command Structure

under JFCC-NW

Jan 05___

DIR DISA dual-hatted JTF-GNO


JFCC-NW Implementation Directive

Fort Meade, MD



CONUS Installations In Global Context







- Extends the Army's global network construct to CONUS installations and beyond to network end devices
- Empowers a single Army command (NETCOM) to provide, operate, manage and defend the Army's global network
- Enables enterprise capabilities of Network Service Centers

One Army Network – One Army Global Network Command



End-State Summary



NETCOM

- Controls the global network & provides enterprise capabilities
- Responsible for Information Assurance/Computer Network
 Defense, configuration & management of devices on the network
- Required resources are assigned to NETCOM (IMCOM DOIMs)

>Installations

- No longer responsible for network & related functions on installation
- Retain responsibility for multi-media & visual information services (realigned to other garrison functions)

➤ Tenants / Organizations / Units (including Garrisons)

- Responsible for end-user device procurement, accountability & replacement
- Leaders remain responsible for enforcing policies & procedures



Army Warfighters' Forum (WfF)







I (US) Corps:

Stryker BrigadeCombat Team (SBCT)



III (US) Corps:

Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT)



XVIII Abn (US) Corps:

 Infantry (Light) Brigade Combat Team (IBCT)



Combined Arms Sustainment Command:

Sustain Forum

... Other





WfF Website URLs



➤ Stryker BCT WfF:

https://strykernet.army.mil/sites/warrior/default.aspx

➤ Heavy BCT WfF (Behind AKO):

https://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/432229

➤ Infantry BCT WfF (behind BCKS) Can only be reached by clicking on IBCT WfF link on ACOM home page on AKO. ACOM Portal Home Page:

https://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/452027

➤ Sustainment WfF (Behind AKO):

https://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/372426



Balancing Iraq & Afghanistan



Iraq

- C4 Infrastructure
 - Build Out StrategicOverwatch Bases(SOB)
 - Leverage Commercial Capabilities
- C4 Forces
 - Enable Future Operations



Afghanistan

- C4 Infrastructure
 - Build Out FOBs
 - Leverage Commercial Capabilities
- C4 Forces
 - Fix Baseline
 - Enable Future Operations
 - Define and Operationalize Mission Network
- Cross border communications

C4 Capabilities

Iraq

Build operational flexibility in Afghanistan while preserving in Iraq




LWN/BC Strategy Framework



Objective: Deliver relevant, affordable, and interoperable LandWarNet/Battle Command capabilities sets to the Generating and Operational Force within the ARFORGEN process – <u>over time</u>

Framework: A portfolio construct focused on the development of Capability Sets for modular formations to synchronize and integrate all generating force processes to incrementally deliver improved capabilities – or modernize <u>over time</u>




All LWN/BC capabilities – in 2 year sets → tailored for each modular formation



Capability Set – Portfolio Framework





Unified Battle Command:

- Establish minimum essential for all
- Tailor "up" to meet specific formation / Soldier requirements
- Define and achieve over time "optimum" degree of integration

Capacity Metrics:

- By echelon
- By domain: satellite / air / terrestrial
- By mobility factor

Enterprise Metrics:


- Generating force processes
- Enterprise process command & control



Unified Battle Command




Consistent services supporting alternative Network environments





WIN-T Increments DAE Certified / Restructured 5 June 07 ADM







WIN-T Increment 2 Proven Success in Dec 08



WIN-T INC 2 NetOps demonstration was highly successful

- NetOps Tools successfully planned and managed largest and most complex INC 2 network assembled to date (50 nodes) consisting of both OTM & ATH WIN-T systems utilizing one channel
- Validated implementation of self-forming/self-healing network capability: resynchronized without human intervention
- WIN-T OTM Radios (LOS & BLOS) met expectations and demonstrated TRL-6 and higher
 - Excellent HNW & NCW connectivity, message completion rate is ~90%
 - NCW OTM demonstrated 256 Kbps 2 Mbps
 - HNR OTM demonstrated 5 Mbps 40 Mbps









TSAT Termination – Army Impacts



- ➤ TSAT was the centerpiece of the *Transformational Communications*Architecture (TCA)
- Recommendation to terminate TSAT creates <u>capability gaps</u> in:
 - <u>Capacity</u>: 54% of ground combatants in OA-08 scenario on TSAT Must now move to WGS
 - Throughput: TSAT optimized for high capacity (T1), networked, protected signal to highly mobile users, WGS capable of 256 kbps — Current AEHF does not provide a ground force, high capacity COTM solution
 - <u>Terminal Density</u>: TSAT sized to reach thousands of mobile ground combatants – WGS will serve fewer users in an AOR
 - <u>Protection</u>: TSAT designed to provide AJ/AS service WGS is subject to jamming disruption
- Recently completed TSAT Interim Design Review reveals several technologies that may have potential for WGS or AEHF upgrades

All Army SATCOM Stakeholders will work with AFSPC & Joint Community to achieve workable solutions



Conclusions





...working to restore balance to the Army



...Way Ahead to support an Expeditionary Army



...organizing to focus efforts and support Joint Command

Space & C4

...continuing to work with Joint Community to achieve solutions for the Warfighter







America's Army: The Strength of the Nation - Army Strong




Service-Disabled Vet-Owned Small Business (SDVOSB) Opportunities



- Veterans Benefits Act of 2003 & Executive Order 13360 sets goal of 3% for SDVOSB Contracts
- Over 12,000 SDVOSB firms registered in Central Contractor Registration (CCR) Database
- Center for Veterans Enterprise maintain VetBiz Vendor Info Pages (VIP) Database
- Army Small Business Website useful resource for SDVOSB http://www.sellingtoarmy.info
- Government Services Agencies Website useful resource as well http://www.gsa.gov/portal









LTG Jeff Sorenson

Chief Information Officer/G-6

AMERICA'S ARMY: THE STRENGTH OF THE NATION
ARMY STRONG